We use newly assembled data on regulation in several sectors of many OECD countries to provide evidence that regulatory reform of product markets is associated with an increase in investment. A component of reform that plays a very important role is entry liberalization, but privatization also has a substantial effect on investment. Sensitivity analysis suggests that our results are robust.
Introduction
In the past decade the rate of GDP growth has been remarkably different amongst OECD countries. One of the most striking and often cited comparisons is the one between the US with a 4.3 percent average GDP growth in the second half of the nineties and large continental European economies (Germany, Italy and France) with 2 percent average growth. One commonly held explanation of these differences is that a stricter regulation of markets has prevented faster growth in many European countries especially in a period, the nineties, of rapid technological innovation. Is this true? This paper suggests that the answer is "yes": various measures of product market regulation are negatively related to investment, which is an important engine of growth. * We would like to thank Frank Gollop, Silvana Tenreyo, Alessandro Sembenelli, Xavier Vives, three anonymous referees, and participants at seminars at Boston College, Brandeis, European Economic Association's 18th Annual Congress, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, IGIER Bocconi, International Society for New Institutional Economics' 7th Annual Conference, NBER Summer Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, University College of Dublin, and World Bank for useful comments. Alesina is grateful for Þnancial support to the NSF for a grant through the NBER. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the institutions to which they are afÞliated.
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Most OECD countries have experienced some form of regulatory reforms (deregulation for short) implying entry liberalization and privatization in the last decades. However, the timing, extent, nature, and starting point varies across countries. For instance, the United States started deregulating earlier, already in the seventies. In 1977, 17 per cent of the US GNP was produced by fully regulated industries, and by 1988 this total had been cut to 6.6 percent of GNP. 1 Other early and decisive reformers have been New Zealand and Britain, while laggards have been Italy and France.
We rely on these diverse histories to study the effects of regulatory reforms in sectors which were traditionally most heavily sheltered from competition and have witnessed, at different times and to different degrees, some form of deregulation and privatization in various countries. SpeciÞcally, we look at the effects of regulation on investment in the transport (airlines, road freight and railways), communication (telecommunications and postal) and utilities (electricity and gas) sectors. We measure regulation with different time varying indicators that capture entry barriers and the extent of public ownership, among other things.
Regulatory reforms have had a signiÞcant positive impact on capital accumulation in the transport, communication, and utilities industries. In particular, both liberalization of entry in potentially competitive markets and privatization of public enterprises seem to have spurred investment. 2 There is also evidence that the marginal effect of deregulation on investment is greater when the policy reform is large and when changes occur starting from already lower levels of regulation. In other words, small changes in a heavy regulated environment are not likely to produce much of an effect.
Much of the literature on the effects of regulation in OECD countries is concerned with the labor market, as for instance, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) . Work on the macroeconomic effects of goods market is more limited. 3 Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) develop an insightful model of both labor market and product market regulation and their interconnection. Nicoletti et al. (2001a, b) provide empirical evidence in favor of a negative effect of anti-competitive product market regulation on employment in a panel of OECD countries. Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) show that regulation in the French retail trade industry has lowered employment, and Pissarides (2001) and Haefke and Ebell show that this result carries over to mod- 1 See Winston (1993) . The Þgures are from the January 1991 Survey of Current Business. 2 Our conclusion that less intrusive government intervention favors private investment is consistent with the Þnding by Alesina et al. (2002) . They show in a panel of OECD countries that a reduction of the size of government measured by total spending and total taxation over GDP increases the private accumulation of capital. Results by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) on the US are on the same line. 3 There is of course a vast literature on the microeconomics of regulation and deregulation. See for instance the surveys by Joskow and Rose (1989) , Peoples (1998) , and Winston (1993) . els in which equilibrium employment (unemployment) results from a job-matching process. Moreover, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) Þnd that product market regulation lowers multifactor productivity growth in OECD countries, while Bassanini and Ernst (2002) Þnd a negative effect of regulation on R&D. Finally, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) focus on regulations that affect how easy it is to start a business in 85 countries. Their paper contrasts developing countries with developed ones and lends support to the view of excessive regulation as a hindrance to entrepreneurship. 4 To our knowledge, there are no contributions in the literature that use broad time varying measures of product market regulation and look at the relationship between regulatory reforms and investment in a panel context.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model and discusses several channels through which regulation can affect capital accumulation. Section 3 describes our data and, in particular, the measurement of the regulatory environment. Section 4 discusses our results in sectors (utilities, telecommunication, transport) which were heavily regulated and have experienced various forms of deregulation. The last section concludes.
Product Market Regulation and Investment: Some Theory
Product market regulation can inßuence investment in several ways. First, changes in regulation affect the markup of prices over marginal costs, because of their impact, for instance, on entry barriers and, hence, on the number of Þrms. This mechanism is emphasized by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) in a non-competitive model of employment determination. Second, regulation can inßuence the costs that even existing Þrms face when expanding their productive capacity. For example, red tape and other forms of regulatory burdens can increase Þrms' costs of adjusting the capital stock and hamper their capacity to react to changes in fundamentals. Third, for certain sectors, regulation imposes a ceiling on the rate of return on capital that Þrms are allowed to earn. This affects the demand for capital relative to labor (Averch and Johnson (1962)). Finally, if product markets regulatory reforms occur together with privatization (or nationalization) policies, changes in ownership structure can also affect investment. We begin by embedding the Þrst two ideas in a standard model of investment with imperfect competition in the output market. 5 We will show that regulatory reforms that result in reduction in entry barriers, in the markup of prices over cost and in adjustment costs tend to stimulate capital accumulation. We do then emphasize that there are counterarguments to this conclusion. For instance, removing the ceiling on the rate of return that can be earned on capital may reduce the desired capital stock and, therefore, investment. Moreover, agency problems and political mandates make the effect of privatization ambiguous.
Finally, it should be considered that in some network industries such as utilities and telecommunications, reforms entailing service liberalization and price rules for accessing networks can have conßicting inßuences on investment. For instance, lacking appropriate regulation, vertically-integrated network owners can have incentives to strategically restrict capacity to prevent entry of other service providers. While unbundling of networks can help solving competition problems, its effects on investment depend on the governance structure of the newly-created network companies, which in some cases can provide few incentives for maintenance and expansion of capacity. Similarly, ill-designed access prices, whereby for instance prices do not cover network costs, can discourage investment in new capacity. Conversely, access prices that are too high may cause overcapacity, with service providers inefÞciently investing in their own networks.
The difÞculty of pinning down at a theoretical level the effect of product market reforms on investment mirrors an analogous problem in assessing its effect on innovation. The early endogenous growth literature suggested that greater product market competition generates less innovative activity because it reduces the monopoly rents accruing to innovators. More recent contributions point out that more competition may stimulate R&D because it encourages R&D investments aimed at escaping competition (See, for instance, Aghion et al. (2001) , and Aghion et al. (2002) ). Vives (2004) shows that greater market size and /or product substitutability, usually associated with deregulation, tend to increase R&D. It is true that a decrease in entry costs in an industry, in a free entry context, tends to decrease the innovation effort per Þrm. However, aggregate investment can still increase due to a surge in the number of entrants. All this emphasizes the importance of empirical work in assessing the effect of deregulation on the dynamic behavior of the economy.
Regulation, the markup and adjustment costs
We assume that each monopolistic competitive Þrm produces a differentiated product with capital and labor and faces a demand for its good of the form:
where Y is average real output demanded, P the average price level, and ε the elasticity of demand. 6 As in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) , we assume that the elasticity of demand varies inversely with the degree of product market regulation: tighter regulation is associated with a lower elasticity. One way to rationalize this is to assume that the elasticity of demand is an increasing function of the number of Þrms, m. Hence, ε = g(m), where g # (·) > 0. 7 If we deÞne the markup of prices over marginal costs as (1 + µ) =
, then µ is a decreasing function of the number of Þrms (µ = µ(g(m)), with µ # < 0). We begin by assuming that the regulatory authority (the government for short) determines administratively the number of Þrms. This assumption is not too far from reality in most of the sectors we deal with in the estimation (the only exception being road freight). In this case, deregulation of product markets leads to a larger number of Þrms, hence, a decrease in µ. In the next section, we let instead the number of Þrms to be endogenously determined by a standard entry condition, but entry is costly and regulation determines the size of such costs. Firms choose capital and labor to maximize the present discounted value of cash ßow V :
6 If the demand functions are derived from Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, P has the standard CES form. 7 Other aspects of regulation may also affect the elasticity of demand, for any given m. For instance, changes in tariff and non tariff barriers may affect the availability of foreign products on domestic markets and, hence, the elasticity of demand. Similarly, the latter will be affected by the introduction of common standards across countries. A simple way to modify the model to account for such effects would be to write, as Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) do, ε = εg(m), where g # (·) > 0 and ε captures the aspects of product market regulation mentioned above. Since we do not focus on changes in trade barriers or on the introduction of common standards, we will continue with our simpler speciÞcation. Finally, note also that an inverse relation between the markup and the number of Þrms can be obtained in a variety of models and does not require a model with product differentiation. For instance, it holds in a model with Cournot competition and homogeneous products.
where K i , L i ,and I i denote capital, labor and investment, respectively. F(K i , L i ) is linear and homogeneous in K i and L i with decreasing returns to each factor, W is the nominal wage (assumed to be identical for each Þrm) and r is the real rate of interest. 8 Firms face adjustment costs that have the standard linear homogeneous quadratic form
We assume that product market regulation also affects b; in particular, deregulation decreases it. With this we capture the reduction in the shadow and actual costs "of doing business" associated with red tape and other administrative impediments that hamper Þrms' choices. The maximization problem is subject to the goods' demand function (1) and to the capital accumulation equation:
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that r is exogenous, as in a small open economy, and constant. 9 We can then easily derive the Þrst order conditions for labor, investment and the capital stock. Imposing the symmetric equilibrium so that P i = P, substituting the Þrst order condition for investment into the Þrst order condition for capital and in equation (3) and rearranging, we obtain:
where k i = K i /L i , w = W/P and we have dropped subscript i since all Þrms behave identically in equilibrium. Equations (5) and (6) determine the equilibrium 8 Note that we are assuming constant return to scale. Some industries may be regulated because they display natural monopoly characteristics due to the presence of increasing returns. We can easily model increasing returns following Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) by using the production function
) displaying constant returns, and # representing a positive constant determined by technology only and capturing Þxed costs. Note that since the Þrst order conditions and the equations of motion remain unaltered the conclusions obtained in section 2.1 would be unchanged. 9 Note that many of the countries covered in our sample are indeed small open economies. Another way of closing the model is to consider explicitly the consumption choice of individuals, as in Abel and Blanchard (1983) . This complicates the model, without providing additional insights for the purpose at hand. 6 path for the capital-labor ratio, k, and the shadow value of capital, q, for a given µ and b. Also, given the assumption of a Þxed labor supply, L, equations (5) and (6) determine the equilibrium level of the aggregate capital stock as K = k L. The system is saddle-path stable. Using (5) and (6), we obtain the steady state value of k as:
Equation (7) implies that an unanticipated permanent increase in the number of Þrms allowed to operate generates a decrease in the markup, µ, and leads (ceteris paribus) to an increase in the steady state value of k (since f ## (k) is negative), i.e. ∂k/∂m > 0. Following the decrease in µ, the shadow value of capital jumps up, leading to an increase in the investment rate until the new steady state is reached. Similarly, for given µ, a decrease in the adjustment cost parameter b leads to an increase in the steady state level of k, i.e. ∂k/∂b > 0. In response to a regulatory reform that decreases the cost of adjusting the capital stock, the shadow value of capital initially jumps up and then it settles to a lower steady state value. Moreover, Þrms' investment is now more responsive to the marginal proÞtability of capital. Hence, the capital stock increases in the long-run.
In conclusion, deregulation, by decreasing µ or b or both, leads to an expansion of the capital stock and investment through both the markup and the adjustment cost channel. Using the previous results and the Þrst order condition of the Þrm with respect to labor (4), one can show that the real wage decreases in µ and b. A decrease in the markup or in the adjustment cost parameter leads to a higher capital stock and, hence, to a higher marginal product of labor. Moreover, the markup also acts as a tax on the use of labor, at each level of k i . Hence, a decrease in µ leads to a higher labor demand and, given a Þxed labor supply, to a higher equilibrium wage. 10 
Regulation and entry: endogenizing the number of Þrms
Up to this point, we have assumed that the government can mandate the number of Þrms in the market. It is more realistic to assume that the number of Þrms is endogenously determined and can only be indirectly affected by the government through regulation of entry. Firms entry and exit the market and the number of Þrms is determined by the following condition:
where cK i measures entry costs, established by regulation and assumed to be proportional to capital. Note that the model's qualitative conclusions on the effect of regulation on investment do not change if we assume that entry costs are proportional to labor (c = cL i ) or are Þxed (c = c). Equation (8) implies:
In steady state I i = δK i , and dV/dt = 0. Hence, given the linear homogeneity of F(K i , L i ), in the symmetric equilibrium, we can rewrite the entry condition that allows to determine the number of Þrms m as:
From the Þrst order condition for labor, the wage is a function of k. Moreover, k is an implicit function of µ, hence m, and b through (7), i.e. k = k(µ(g(m)), b), with k m > 0 and k b < 0. Therefore, (10) determines implicitly the number of Þrms as a function of entry costs, c, the adjustment cost parameter b, the depreciation rate δ, the interest rate r, and the Þxed labor supply, L. The effect of a change in entry costs on investment can be decomposed in: a) the impact of entry costs on the number of Þrms and b) the effect of the number of Þrms on the capital stock, i.e. ∂k/∂c = (∂k/∂m) (∂m/∂c). We have already shown above that ∂k/∂m > 0, hence we need to determine the sign of ∂m/∂c. One can check that, without further assumptions, the sign of ∂m/∂c is ambiguous. If F(K i , L i ) is Cobb-Douglas with an elasticity of output with respect to capital equal to α, it is possible to show that a sufÞcient condition for deregulation to lead to an increase in the number of Þrms (∂m/∂c < 0) is:
This condition is almost surely satisÞed for reasonable parameters combinations, so that a decrease in entry costs generates an increase in the number of Þrms, a decrease in the markup, and an increase in the capital stock. For instance, for α = 0.35, r = 0.02, δ = 0.06, b = 10, ∂m/∂c is negative if the markup µ is lower than 157%. Thus, a reduction in entry costs leads to an increase in the number of Þrms and a lower mark up.
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Let's now consider the steady state effect of a change in the adjustment cost parameter, allowing for a change in the equilibrium number of Þrms that may occur as a result of variations in b. In the long-run with m variable, the total effect is dk/db = (∂k/∂b) + (∂k/∂m) (∂m/∂b). As shown above, deregulation captured by a decrease in b has a positive effect on the capital stock, for a given m, since ∂k/∂b < 0. Also, (∂k/∂m) > 0. However, it is not possible to sign ∂m/∂b, and, hence, the total effect, without additional assumptions. Again, some algebra leads us to conclude that, under a Cobb-Douglas technology, the condition in (11) guarantees that dk/db < 0. Hence, also in this case, a regulatory reform that decreases the cost for the Þrm to adjust their capacity leads to a higher level of the capital stock in the long-run.
The general conclusion that can be derived from the models we have analyzed so far is that deregulation of product markets has a positive effect on capital accumulation if it generates a reduction in the markup of prices over marginal costs (for instance through a reduction in entry barriers) or if it lowers costs of adjusting the capital stock.
Additional channels
Regulation can affect investment through additional channels. First consider capital market imperfections. Assume that, because of informational asymmetries, there is imperfect substitutability between internal and external sources of Þnance. If deregulation leads to a decrease in markups and in the availability of internal funds, it may have a negative effect on investment through this cost of capital channel. Although this reasoning is compelling for Þrms severely affected by informational asymmetries and with limited collateralizable assets, such as small and young Þrms, it is less convincing for the large Þrms that operate in the sectors we will concentrate upon in our empirical work.
The second channel is operative when regulation imposes a ceiling on the rate of return on capital invested in some sectors. If the constraint binds, the choice of factor proportion may be altered in favor of more capital intensive techniques and the amount of capital used increases relative to the one chosen in the absence of constraints. This is the well know argument due originally to Averch and Johnson 11 If the production function is F(K i , L i ) − #, in order to allow for increasing returns, the term − #m L should be included on the lhs of (10) making more likely that a decrease in entry costs increases m. The sufÞcient condition in (11) remains unchanged.
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(1962) and reÞned, subsequently, by other authors. 12 The basic idea is that by investing in additional capital, Þrms increase the base to which the (constrained) rate of return is applied, resulting in a greater total remuneration for capital. The consequence is that reduction in the rate of return on capital below the proÞt maximizing level (resulting from the imposition of a binding ceiling) leads to an increase in the capital stock. The lower the allowed rate of return is, the greater is the capital stock employed by the Þrm. 13 Removing the binding constraint would, instead, reduce the desired capital stock and therefore investment.
The last argument that we consider has to do with the presence of public or semi-public enterprises, which in many countries accounted for a large fraction of production in some sectors such as utilities and transport, and also in the manufacturing sector. Product market regulatory reforms that have taken place in the last decades have often been accompanied by privatization. The disappearing or reduced importance of a dominant publicly owned player, facing a soft budget constraint, is one of the reasons why deregulation has lead to a decrease in entry barriers for new privately owned Þrms.
14 The model with entry costs we have analyzed above captures therefore the shrinking role of public enterprises if we think of cK i as a shadow cost.
However, public enterprises may have been heavy investors because of a political mandate imposed on them or because of their managers's incentives. Managers of public enterprises often behave as empire builders, because their reward in terms of monetary compensation, power, and perks may be related to the size of the organization. It is also unlikely that capital markets can effectively restrict this type of behavior. Alternatively, their objective may be to maximize political support, and this may lead to set prices below the proÞt maximizing level (Peltzman (1971)). Thus, one may have overexpansion and over-investment in public enterprises, so that with privatization total investment might fall. In order to disentangle the multifaceted effects of privatization one would need a break down of data on an internationally comparable basis of investment by sectors and by type of Þrm: private, with public participation, public, etc. Unfortunately, these data are not available. Therefore, if total investment increases after a policy change that 12 See also Takayama (1969) and Baumol and Klevorick (1970) . The relevance of the AverchJohnson model has been debated empirically, typically in the power generating sector, with mixed results. See, for instance, Petersen (1975) and Boyes (1976) . 13 One can obtain similar predictions if the regulatory authority sets directly the (relative) prices Þrms can charge and mandates that Þrms satisfy all demand at those prices. If prices are set below the (monopoly) maximizing prices output demanded would rise relative to the unconstrained case. As a result the demand of both capital and labor would be higher, for given factor prices. 14 Sappington and Sidak (2003) show that public enterprises have stronger incentives to foreclose entry to competitors than private enterprises.
implies both privatization and a lowering of entry barriers, it may mean that the increase of private investment more than compensate the possible fall of investment in privatized enterprises.
Summing up, the effect of "deregulation" on investment is, at a theoretical level, ambiguous. Reforms which imply reduction in entry barriers and in the markup are likely to lead to an increase in investment. Aspects of deregulation that remove binding constraints on rates of return may determine a reduction of investment. Finally, the effect of privatization is ambiguous. In the end, the answer has to be found empirically.
The Data
For our empirical assessment of the effects of product market regulation we use time varying measures of regulation for several non manufacturing industries in OECD countries for which investment, capital and value added data are also available. In the two next subsections we describe in detail the construction of the main variables used in estimation.
The Industry-Level Regulation Data
In order to capture the intensity of regulation, we use data collected by Nicoletti et al. (2001) , (who extended the cross-sectional data contained in the OECD International Regulation Database) and described in detail by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) . These data are used to construct time-series indicators of overall regulation, barriers to entry and public ownership from 1975 to 1998 in 21 OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, UK, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, US, New Zealand) for seven non-manufacturing industries: electricity and gas supply, road freight, air passenger transport, rail transport, post and telecommunications (Þxed and mobile). The regulatory indicators measure on a scale from 0 to 6 (from least to most restrictive) restrictions on competition and private governance. Industry-speciÞc regulation data were collected from both national sources (by means of speciÞc surveys) and published sources. Consistent historical data for the 1975-1998 period were drawn from various publications and were vetted by OECD experts. Table A1 in the appendix contains details on the construction of the indicators.
The summary index of regulation includes information on entry barriers, public ownership, the market share of the dominant player(s) (in the telephone, gas and railroad sectors), and price controls (in the road freight industry). Entry barri-ers cover legal limitations on the number of companies in potentially-competitive markets and rules on vertical integration of network industries. The barriers to entry indicator takes a value of 0 when entry is free (i.e.: a situation with three or more competitors and with complete ownership separation of natural monopoly and competitive segments of the industry) and a value of 6 when entry is severely restricted (i.e.: situations with legal monopoly and full vertical integration in network industries or restrictive licensing in other industries). Intermediate values represent partial liberalization of entry (e.g. legal duopoly, mere accounting separation of natural monopoly and competitive segments). Public ownership measures the share of equity owned by central or municipal governments in Þrms of a given sector. The two polar cases are no public ownership (0 value of the indicator) and full public ownership (a value of 6 for the indicator). Whenever data are available (i.e. telecoms, air transport), intermediate values of the public ownership indicator are calculated as an increasing function of the actual share of equity held by the government in the dominant Þrm. In some cases (e.g. the energy industries), a simpler scale is used pointing to full or majority control by the government (a value of 6), various degrees of mixed public/private ownership (intermediate values), marginal public share or full private ownership (a value of 0).
The construction of the indicators involved the following steps. First, separate indicators for barriers to entry, public ownership, market share of new entrants, and price controls were created at the Þnest available level of industry disaggregation (e.g. mobile and Þxed telephony). Second, these indicators were aggregated at the industry level taking simple averages or revenue-weighted averages (when aggregating horizontal segments of industries, such as mobile and Þxed telephony). Third, the index of overall regulation is obtained by averaging in each of the seven industries the indicators of barriers to entry, public ownership, market share of new entrants, and price controls. Finally, we used simple averaging of the indices to reach the level of industry aggregation for which investment and value added data are available. More speciÞcally, we have aggregated the regulation indices for the seven sectors in three broader sectors: utilities (electricity and gas), communication (telecommunications and post), and transportation (airlines, road freight and railways).
In our regressions we use four different indicators of regulation: R EG O L, the overall indicator including all the regulation dimensions; R EG N O, which includes all dimensions except public ownership; B E V I , which summarizes barriers to entry (comprising legal restrictions and vertical integration), and R EG P O, which includes only public ownership information. The reason for isolating the effect of public ownership is that, in principle, public ownership per se does not imply rules and restrictions that private investors have to follow. However, it is likely to inßuence the shadow cost of entry for private Þrms. Moreover, as dis-cussed above, investment choices of public enterprises may differ from those of private Þrms. The market share of new entrants will not be used individually as an explanatory variable. It is certainly useful to measure the effectiveness of entry liberalization in promoting competition, but, as an outcome variable, it is also the component most affected by potential endogeneity problems. Finally, we do not use the indicator of price controls by itself because data on price controls are available only for the road freight industry. Figure 1 plots the level of regulation, as measured by the summary indicator R EG O L, in 1975 and in 1998 on the horizontal and vertical axis respectively. Countries-sectors differ both in terms of the level of regulation and in terms of changes in the regulatory environment. Virtually all the observations are below the 45 degree line indicating a general trend toward liberalization and privatization. Interestingly, no country except the US had low regulation at the beginning of the sample in the three broad industry aggregates. The US was the least regulated economy at the beginning of the sample, was still so in 1998, and implemented strong deregulation policies over the period. For example, the index measuring the level of regulation in the US in the transport sector is equal to 4.25 in 1975 and to 0.75 in 1998, a decrease of about 82%. Deregulation has also been particularly strong in the UK and New Zealand, which were highly regulated at the beginning of the sample, while they rank among the most "market-oriented" economies in 1998. For example, regulation decreased by 86% from 5.5 to 0.75 in the transport sector in New Zealand and by 78% (from 5.63 to 1.25) and 69% (from 5.08 to 1.58) in the utilities and communications sectors in the UK. On the contrary, countries like Italy, France, Greece were among the most regulated economies in 1975 and were still so in 1998.
The timing of regulatory reforms also differs across countries. Figures 2 and 3 plot the average across all seven non-manufacturing industries of the index B EV I and R EG P O for the following representative countries: US, UK, New Zealand, Germany, France, Spain and Italy. While the Þrst three countries reduced entry barriers starting from the late seventies/early eighties, in Italy and Spain the process did not begin till the nineties, and in France and Germany the changes that occurred during the eighties were minor. The index measuring the extent of public ownership points to a generalized trend towards privatization. Once again, the process has been rather timid in Italy and France and much more decisive in New Zealand and UK. Note that the US is the only country that does not show a tendency to reduce public enterprises. However, the US had the smallest beginning of period level of public ownership, much below the level of continental Europe. 
The Investment and Other Data
The economic data on investment, capital stock, and value added at the countrysector-year level for the period 1975-1998 come from the OECD STAN database for Industrial Analysis, Revision 3 (ISIC Rev. 3), augmented with data from the OECD's International Sectorial Database (ISDB). These databases cover both services and manufacturing sectors for the OECD countries. The macroeconomic data for the non-manufacturing sectors for which we have indices of regulation are available at the following level of industry aggregation: (i) electricity, gas and water, (ii) communications and posts, (iii) transport and storage, and (iv) transport, storage and communications, for countries in which no separate data for communications and transport is available. From now on, we will name the sectors deÞned in (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) utilities, U , communications, C, transport, T , and transport and communications, T C, respectively. We use the data at the most disaggregated level (sectors U , C, T ) whenever they are available and data for sectors U and T C otherwise. Sectors U , C, T are available for Belgium Canada, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, UK, Italy, Sweden, sectors U and T C for Australia, and the US, and sector U for Japan. We merge the data contained in the augmented STAN-ISDB data set with the database containing the regulation indices R EG O L, R EG N O, B EV I , and R EG P O. As mentioned above, because data on investment, capital, and value added are not available for each single industry for which regulation indices exist, we mapped the industry-level regulatory indicators into the non-manufacturing aggregates covered by our STAN-ISDB industrial statistics database. Investment in utilities, transport and communication sectors represents about 18% of total business investment in OECD countries, approximately the same share as the one of the manufacturing sector. Hence, our analysis on the effect of deregulation on investment covers quite a large component of business sector investment in OECD countries. Figure 4 plots the average of investment as a share of the capital stock in the utility, communications, and transport sectors in the US and UK (selected as the early and more decisive deregulators) and in the three largest continental European countries, Italy, France and Germany, (selected as late and timid deregulators). The pattern of the investment rate in one group of countries is the opposite of the other: while in US and UK investment as a share of the capital stock increased from 3.7% in 1975 to 8.15% in 1998, in the large continental European countries the investment rate decreased by 5 percentage points from 9.4% to 4.4%. As shown in Þgures 1-3, US and UK strongly liberalized product markets starting in the late seventies/early eighties, while deregulation reforms were almost absent in Italy, France and Germany till the nineties.
We can get some additional prima facie evidence on the effect of deregulation by checking whether the trend behavior of the investment rate in each sector of a particular country changes after the beginning of deregulation in that sector as measured by the overall index R EG O L. 15 Controlling for sector/country effects and for time effects, we Þnd that the coefÞcient of the trend is negative and statistically signiÞcant before the beginning of deregulation (the coefÞcient is equal to -0.0015 and the t-statistics is equal to -4.66) and that there is a positive and signiÞcant change in the slope of the trend after the beginning of deregulation (the slope coefÞcient increases by 0.0011 with an associated t-statistics on the change of 4.98). There is also a positive intercept shift but it is not signiÞcant (0.0020 with a t-statistics of 1.29).
Investment and Regulation: Econometric Results
We now turn to a systematic econometric investigation of the effect of regulation on investment. We Þrst discuss the results in the context of a simple dynamic panel model of investment and regulation, controlling for sector/country Þxed effects and common or sector speciÞc year effects. We show that our proxies for regulation have a signiÞcant negative effect on investment in almost all cases. We then present evidence that our conclusions are robust to various extensions and sensitivity checks.
Basic SpeciÞcation
We base our investigation on estimation of various versions of an unrestricted dynamic model of investment of the form: (12) where t represents years, i denotes countries and j sectors. R EG is one of our four indices of regulation described above (REG O L, R EG N O, B EV I , and R EG P O). The remaining terms capture country/sector speciÞc Þxed effects, and common (or sector speciÞc) year dummies.
If we take the simple models of the previous section literally, regulation should not have a long-run effect on the investment rate, as the latter equals simply the depreciation rate in the steady state. However, even simple changes would invalidate this result. For instance, if adjustment costs are speciÞed as in Uzawa (1969) , so that gross investment turns into capital at a decreasing rate, changes in the adjustment cost parameter associated with deregulation will affect the steady state value of the investment rate (we have not used this model in the theoretical section because it is more complicated). More fundamentally, it is possible to envision endogenous growth models in which regulation may affect the steady state growth rate of the capital stock, and, hence, the investment rate. For this reason, in our econometric work, we let the data decide whether or not there is a long-run effect of regulation on the investment rate.
We estimate three models that differ for the number of lags of the regulatory index included in equation (12) . The most general model contains the contemporaneous, once lagged, and twice lagged value of the regulation variable. The intermediate model restricts the coefÞcient of the contemporaneous value of the regulation index to be equal to zero. The most restricted model only includes the once lagged value of the regulation indicator. We do so to be sure that results are not sensitive to the number of lags of the regulatory index included in the regression. In particular, the speciÞcations that exclude the contemporaneous value of the regulatory indicator are less open to criticisms about the endogeneity of the regulatory index itself due to deregulation occurring contemporaneously with a positive (or negative, for that matter) idiosyncratic shock to investment. 16 For brevity sake, we show only results for the intermediate model containing the regulation index lagged one and two periods. Results for the other models are available in the working paper version of this paper. For compactness, we report: (i) the sum of the coefÞcients of the regulation variable and the marginal probability of the test for its equality to zero, (ii) the value of the long-run multiplier and the marginal probability of the test for its signiÞcance, (iii) the marginal probability of the test on the hypothesis that the coefÞcients of the index of regulation are jointly zero. We also include the sum of the coefÞcients of the lagged dependent variable and the marginal signiÞcance level for the test of Þrst order serial correlation based on Arellano and Bond (1991) . Note that for the intermediate model the test on the joint equality to zero of the coefÞcients can be interpreted as a test of Granger causality (from regulation to investment).
In Table 1 , part I, we present the results obtained when the model is estimated by OLS with country/sector effects and common year dummies, while in Table 1 , part II, we allow for sector speciÞc year dummies. 17 We Þnd a signiÞcant nega- 16 Although it is possible that regulation at time t is correlated with the idiosyncratic shock at the same time, one must remember that the likelihood of such correlation is reduced by the time lags associated with the design, approval, and implementation of the necessary legislative and administrative changes. 17 OLS estimation with country and sector Þxed effects yields consistent estimates in panels with large T. In our case T is indeed fairly large (T=24). Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedas-tive effect of regulation on investment: the sum of the coefÞcients for summary measures of regulation and the long-run coefÞcients are always signiÞcant at the 1% level across models. The test of joint signiÞcance of the coefÞcients presents a similar picture. We can never reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation in the residuals. When we allow for sector-speciÞc year effects, measures of regulation display a negative and signiÞcant long-run effect as well. Again REG O L, B E V I , R EG P O are signiÞcant at around the 1% level. The exception is R EG N O that now has a marginal signiÞcance level between 1% and 6%. Again, there is no evidence of serial correlation.
Note that this last set of results is very important because technological advances, that are likely to have a sector speciÞc component, were occurring at the same time of regulatory reform, and one needs to control for such technology shocks, when evaluating the effect of deregulation. The inclusion of sector speciÞc year dummies also addresses the possibility that regulation itself may respond to such sector speciÞc technological opportunities, generating an endogeneity problem for the regulation variable in models that do not control for such shocks. For instance, technological change associated with cellular phones and wireless technology may have meant that a new market structure was optimal in the telecommunication sector and may have lent impetus to deregulation. It is very informative that for our measures of regulation still we detect a signiÞcant long-run effect, even after controlling for sector speciÞc year dummies. The size of the long-run effects decreases only minimally.
Results in Table 1 , part I and II, are consistent with the idea that a reduction in barriers to entry is likely to have a positive effect on investment because it leads to a decrease of the markup and, possibly, of the cost associated with capital expansion. Also privatization exercises a positive effect on investment. This suggests that the reduction of barriers to entry for private Þrms associated with privatization more than compensate the reduced importance of potential overinvestment problems due to managerial incentives.
In order to have an idea of the size of the effect of changes in regulation on investment, consider an unit decrease in R EG O L, for Table 1 , part I. The investment rate increases by slightly less that one percentage point in the long-run (.863 of one percent to be precise). Since the investment rate is approximately equal to 6% on average, this would imply an increase to almost 7%. Note that if R EG O L decreases from its third quartile value (5.6) to its Þrst quartile value (3.2), this change generates an increase in the investment rate of approximately two percentage points, which is quite large. The same experiment for B E V I leads to a total increase of 1.5 percentage points (B E V I changes from 5.8 to 3.6 going from the ticity.
third to the Þrst quartile), while for R EG P O to an increase of 1.6 percentage points (R EG P O changes from 5.8 to 2.3 going from the third to the Þrst quartile). Consider also that the sectors in our panels are highly capital intensive: the capital to gross output ratio equals approximately 4.2 and the capital to value added ratio equals 6.5. As a result, the increase of investment as a percentage of gross output or value added is much larger.
Another way of gathering a sense of the magnitude of the changes is to make some experiments with actual values of the indices in different time periods in one country or across countries. Consider, for example, the regulatory reforms implemented in the UK in the transport and communications sector. In the period 1975-1983, the overall index of regulation was constant and equal to 3.8 and the average value of the investment rate was 5.0%. Starting from 1984, the index R EG O L shows a trend toward deregulation and reaches a value of 0.8 in the period 1994-1998. Our model predicts an increase in the investment rate in the long-run of 2.5 percentage points (from 5.0% to 7.5%). The actual increase was 3.0 percentage points.
Let's now compare average values of the regulation indicator R EG O L across countries. For instance, in the period 1994-1998, the average value of R EG O L in the transport and communication sectors is 0.8 in US, 3.42 in Germany and in France, and 4.7 in Italy. The investment rate is 9.0% in US, 5.6% in Germany, 5.9% in France, and 6.8% in Italy. One can compute that if Germany and France regulation changes from 3.4 -their own value -to the US one equal to 0.8, the model predicts an increase in the investment rate by 2.3 percentage points in the long-run, from Germany's average value of 5.6% to 7.9% and from France's average value of 5.9% to 8.2%, much closer to the US average level of 9.0%. Finally, suppose that regulation in Italy changes from 4.6 -its own value -to the US one equal to 0.8, the model predicts an increase in the investment rate by 3.3 percentage points, from 6.8% to 10.1%.
The results presented so far rely on a large T argument for consistency, given the presence of the lagged dependent variable (see Nickell 1981 ). In our case T=24 for most country/sectors. Moreover, one needs to assume lagged regulation to be uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic shock at time t. We have also estimated our models by GMM methods in differenced form, as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) . In this case one relies on large N for consistency. We have observations for 32 country/sectors, which means that some caution is needed in relying excessively on these results. The one step GMM results for the differenced version of the equations estimated in Table 1 , part I, are reported in Table 1 2003)). 18 Differencing removes the country/sector effects. The test of serial correlation suggests the presence of Þrst order serial correlation (as one would expect if the error term in the level model is serially uncorrelated), but there is no evidence of second order serial correlation, making the use of the second lag of the variables as instruments legitimate. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions also does not suggest gross mis-speciÞcation of the equation. The overall results are again supportive of a signiÞcant role for regulation as a determinant of investment. The marginal signiÞcance level vary between 1% and 4% and the size of the effect is only marginally smaller than those obtained when models are estimated by OLS. 
Investment, Deregulation and Privatization
We have shown that deregulation increases total investment, which includes both private investment and investment by public or semi public enterprises. Ideally we would like to separate the two, but data limitations do not allow us to do so. Data for selected countries (and periods) show that investment of public enterprises has decreased, especially in Europe, probably as a result of tighter budget constraints faced by public enterprises and of the process of privatization. 20 What we can do is to include both measures of deregulation and privatization in the equation for total investment and ascertain if our conclusions concerning the effect of lowering barriers to entry, for which the theoretical predictions are sharper, still hold. Note that this is quite an important yet difÞcult exercise since in several instances the process of deregulation and liberalization have proceeded together. In our sample, the correlation coefÞcient between R EG N O and R EG P O is 0.46 while the correlation between B EV I and R EG P O is 0.45. The main results when we include either R EG N O and R EG P O or B E V I and R EG P O at the same time, are reported in Table 2. 21 Interestingly, the long-run coefÞcient for B EV I continues to be signiÞcant at the 1% level, while R EG P O is now signiÞcant at the 5% level. The size of the coefÞcient for B E V I is reduced but not by much (from -.00623 to -.00562), while the one for R EG P O decreases more substantially (from -.00649 to -.00391). This suggests that the results for the decrease in barriers to entry are stronger, as the theory would suggest, compared to the one for privatization. Results are similar for the speciÞcation with R EG N O and R EG P O.
Controlling for Other Country SpeciÞc or Country/Sector SpeciÞc Variables.
Next we check wether our conclusions concerning deregulation are robust to the inclusion of country speciÞc or country/sector speciÞc variables that may affect investment. The country speciÞc variables are the GDP to capital ratio of the business sector, the real interest rate, the cyclically-adjusted value of the ratios between government expenditure and tax revenue to GDP, and measures of labor market regulation. All variables are lagged once and twice to minimize endogeneity problems. A summary of the results is presented in Table 3 , part I. Our conclusions are virtually unchanged with the inclusion of these variables. As an aside, note that public spending and taxation have a negative, but not signiÞcant effect on the sectorial investment rates. This evidence is at least weakly consistent with that of Alesina et al. (2002) . Moreover, it is very important that our results are robust to the inclusion of indicators of labor market regulation and ßexibility, since some of the countries have introduced signiÞcant labor market reforms in the 80's and 90's. 22 We measure regulation in the labor market using OECD data on employment protection, replacement rate, bargaining coordination, bargaining centralization, degree of corporativism and union density. As an example, we report the results when we use data on the degree of corporativism. This is the only labor market indicator that has a statistically signiÞcant (at least at the 5% level) long-run effect on investment in all regressions of Table 3 , part I. The estimates suggest that an increase in corporativism reduces investment. Instead, changes in the replacement rate have a negative and signiÞcant (at the 10% level) long-run effect on investment in the speciÞcations including REG O L, R EG N O, and B E V I , but not R EG P O. All other labor markets indicators do not have a statistically signiÞcant long-run effect on investment, except when we use the indices of bargaining coordination, bargaining centralization and union density together with R EG P O. In all speciÞcations, the conclusions for product market regulation do not change.
Our next set of experiments consists of adding country/ industry speciÞc variables, such as the real price of investment goods, the real wage and the value addedto-capital ratio (all lagged once and twice), as additional regressors. 23 Results are reported in Table 3 , part II. 24 The long-run coefÞcients of the real price of investment goods and of the real wage are not signiÞcant and the signiÞcance and size of the regulatory variables is not altered. The value added to capital ratio has a signiÞcant and positive long-run effect on the investment rate. The long-run coefÞcients of R EG O L remains signiÞcant at around the 1% level, those for B EV I and R EG P O are now signiÞcant at around the 5% level (6.0% and 4.2% respectively), while R EG N O becomes now insigniÞcant. If we want to calculate the overall impact of regulation on investment, it is also necessary to know the effect of regulation on the value added-to-capital ratio. In the last part of Table 3 , we present the results obtained when regressing Y/K on two lagged value of itself and two lagged values of the regulation indices. While we cannot reject the equality to zero of the long-run coefÞcient for R EG O L, R EG N O, and R EG P O,we can reject this hypothesis for B E V I that is signiÞcantly and negatively related to Y/K . In summary, we can conclude that for all our measures of regulation except R EG N O, our fundamental conclusions on the effect of deregulation on investment still hold.
Heterogeneity in Short-Run Response
So far we have assumed that the response to regulation is the same across sectors and countries. We now allow for heterogeneity in short-run responses, while maintaining the assumption of an identical long-run effect. We begin by reparametrizing the intermediate model as follows:
where
, and α 1 , α 2 , β 1 , and β 2 are the coefÞcients in equation (12) . In equation (13), the long-run effect of regulation is captured by −λ 2 /ϑ 2 , while the short-run response depends upon λ 1 and ϑ 1 . We let the coefÞcients λ 1 and ϑ 1 differ across countries/sectors. We Þnd that regulation does not have a statistically signiÞcant effect on investment in the short-run, in the sense that λ 1 is not statistically signiÞcant. The only exception occurs in the speciÞcation in which regulation is measured by R EG P O for some, but not all, countries/sectors. Second, the results on the long-run effect of regulatory reforms on investment are virtually unchanged. In fact, R EG O L, R EG N O, B EV I and R EG P O have a negative and statistically signiÞcant effect (at the 5% level or better) on investment and the size of the coefÞcients is similar to the one obtained in Table 1 , (see Table 4 ).
Non-linear Effects of Regulatory Reforms
We now investigate whether there is evidence of a non linear response of investment to regulatory changes. To start with, we check whether the long-run effect of regulation on investment depends on the level of regulation itself. In particular, we add to the model, reparametrized as in equation (13), the square of the variable R EG i jt−2 . Results are reported in Table 5 , part I. The coefÞcients on the linear term R EG i jt−2 remain negative and signiÞcant for all the summary measures of regulation, while the coefÞcient on the square term is positive and signiÞcant at the 5% level for R EG O L, R EG N O and B E V I , but not for R EG P O. These results imply that the marginal effects of regulatory reform starting from very high levels of regulation are basically zero. The marginal effects of deregulation are substantial and positive when starting from a more deregulated environment. Another interesting experiment is to see whether the long-run effect of regulation on investment also depends on the magnitude of the change occurred in regulation between 1975 and 1998. We interact the variable R EG i jt−2 in equation (13) with two dummy variables, L ARG E and SM AL L. L ARG E (SM AL L) is equal to one if the change in the overall regulation index between 1975 and 1998 is bigger (smaller) than the median change in the sample and zero otherwise. Results are reported in Table 5 , part II. We Þnd that regulation has a negative and statistically signiÞcant coefÞcient when its change is "large", but not when it is "small". However, a test on the equality of the coefÞcients of R EG i jt−2 multiplied by L ARG E and SM AL L cannot be rejected at conventional critical levels.
Finally, in Table 5 part III, we investigate whether the timing of regulatory reforms matters. More speciÞcally, we check whether deregulation of product markets positively affects investment both in countries that have undertaken reforms early on in the sample and in the "late deregulators" countries. We deÞne two dummy variables, L AT E and E ARLY . L AT E (E ARLY ) is equal to one in countries-sectors where we do not observe (do observe) any decrease in the overall regulation index before 1990 and zero otherwise. As before, we interact the variable R EG i jt−2 in equation (13) with the two dummy variables. We Þnd that deregulation has a negative and statistically signiÞcant effect only when interacted with the dummy E ARLY . In countries-sectors that begin deregulating product markets in the 1990's, a one unit decrease in regulation has no impact on investment. Moreover, the coefÞcient of the dummy variable L AT E is generally negative and statistically signiÞcant.
Note that one may fail to Þnd a statistically signiÞcant effect on investment in "late deregulators" simply because there is not enough variation in the regulation data. However, it is also the case that countries that were opened up to competition earlier in the sample are those that deregulated more deeply. Our conclusions on the lack of short-run effects still hold.
Conclusions
Tight regulation of the product markets has had a large negative effect on investment. The data for sectors that have experienced signiÞcant changes in the regulatory environment suggest that deregulation leads to greater investment in the long-run. A component of reforms that plays a particularly important role is entry liberalization, but privatization also has a positive effect on investment. These results are consistent with theoretical predictions. A reduction in entry barriers generates a reduction of the markup and, hence of the penalty of expanding production, in terms of lost monopoly proÞts. This results in greater investment. When it comes to public ownership, there are contrasting forces at work. While a reduction in public ownership can be seen as lowering the shadow cost of entry, agency problems and political mandates affecting the behavior of public managers may lead to over-accumulation of capital. The empirical analysis suggests that the reduction in the shadow cost of entry is the dominant factor.
Our results are robust to several sensitivity checks and extensions. In particular, we Þnd that the marginal effect of deregulation depends on how deep the change is: more decisive regulatory reforms have a greater marginal impact. Moreover, the marginal effect is greater when one starts from lower levels of regulation. The implication of our analysis is clear: regulatory reforms that substantially lower entry barriers spur investment. However, one must be aware that this is just a piece of the puzzle in assessing the impact of product market reform on the dynamic behavior of the economy. As we have discussed the effect of deregulation on innovation is theoretically ambiguous and more empirical work is needed before we can reach deÞnitive conclusions on the impact of deregulation on overall dynamic efÞciency. In addition, an assessment of the optimality of product market reforms requires a full welfare analysis. This goes beyond the scope of this paper and we leave it for future research. 
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Gas manufacture and distribution

Entry 1/4
Average of indicators of degree of entry regulation in gas production (P), transportation (T) and distribution (D)
1/3
In each industry segment = regulated: 6; partly regulated: 3; unregulated: 0
Vertical integration 1/4
Degree of separation between competitive and non-competitive activities
Full separation between P, T and D: 0; full separation between P and T/D: 1.5; some separation between P and T/D: 3; some separation between T and D: 4.5; no separation: 6 
1/3 Vertical integration
Average of two indicators: vertical separation between generation and transmission (GTS); and overall vertical separation between generation, transmission, distribution and supply (OS)
